Logic and the Hypostatic Union: Two Late Twelfth-Century Responses to the Papal Condemnation of 1177

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Summary: Peter the Lombard developed an influential interpretation of the Incarnation, that in 1177 elicited a condemnation by Pope Alexander III. Nevertheless, after the condemnation the Lombard's view had its defenders. The present paper examines two of the Lombard's defenders on the subject who wrote around 1180: an anonymous student of Peter the Chanter and Stephen Langton. Both the anonymous student and Langton think it is possible to uphold Lombard's theory by employing current conceptual grammatical and logical tools in the explication of key Christological statements.

1. Alexander III's condemnations of 1170 and 1177

In 1170 Pope Alexander III wrote to William, Archbishop of Sens and papal legate in France. In his letter Alexander addressed a matter of grave importance to Christian theology, *viz.*, how to understand the humanity of the incarnate Christ. In particular, there was one interpretation which Alexander wanted to eradicate from the Parisian schools of theology, and this was the one propounded by "Peter, the former bishop of Paris", which is to say Peter the Lombard. As characteristic of the view Alexander focused on the saying "Christ as man is not something". In order to suppress this view William was ordered to gather the bishops under his jurisdiction and instruct them not only to condemn the doctrine but also to teach that Christ is man in the full sense of the word and consists of soul and body. Moreover, as Alexander stressed, especially the theological professors at Paris were to be taught the proper understanding of Christ's manhood.[1]

Seven years later the comparatively mildly phrased letter of 1170 was superseded by a second and much harsher papal order. Obviously, the former letter had not had its desired effect, and in early 1177 William, who had by then moved to the archbishopric of Reims, received further instructions on the issue. Now the saying

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1 Denzinger-Schönmetzer 1967: no. 749. Cf. Nielsen 1982: 359 sqq.

that Christ is not something by being man, was branded as an out-right heresy ("*error*"), and William was to excommunicate on papal authority anybody upholding this understanding.[2] In contradis-tinction to this intolerable heresy Alexander once more stressed that just as Christ is truly God so he is truly man and subsists in soul and flesh.[3] After this forceful condemnation the question was no longer open for debate, and the subject was not broached at the Third Lateran Council in 1179.[4] The papal injunction of 1177 alone was quite sufficient to impress contemporary theologians.

2. Anonymus ex schola Cantoris

How did theologians belonging to the Lombard's school react to this condemnation? Upholding a point of view which was official-ly condemned would, of course, not do – especially not for hope-ful candidates for bishoprics. On the other hand, Alexander had been rather generous inasmuch as he had restricted the condem-nation so as to affect only the single sentence "Christus secundum quod homo non est aliquid". Moreover, even to the most ardent supporter of the Lombard's position it was by no means necessary to uphold this sentence. Provided a proper interpretation was supplied, a proposition like "Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid" was perfectly defensible in the class-rooms of this school.[5]

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2 Denzinger-Schönmetzer 1967: no. 750.

3 On a previous occasion I showed that Alexander III was substantially correct in attributing the condemned theory to the Lombard. This conclusion was reached through textual analysis of the Lombard's exposition of the Incarnation as it is to be found in the third book of the *Sentences*, and not on the – often gossipy – testi-mony of contemporaries (Nielsen 1982: 243 sqq.) Recently, Marcia Colish (1994: 427 sqq.) objected to this interpretation. It is difficult to respond to Colish inas-much as she does not address my evidence.

4 In spite of Walter of St. Victor's testimony to the contrary, it seems unlikely that the Christology of Peter the Lombard and his followers was on the agenda for this meeting; cf. Nielsen 1982: 360-361, and the literature cited there.

5 It is somewhat ironic that Alexander III, who had been an early proponent of the condemned theory, had himself provided just such a "way-out" by saying that Christ as man is something in the sense that as man he is "alicuius modi" (Alexan-der III *Sententiae*: 193). This explanation was later repeated by, e.g., Petrus Pic-taviensis (col. 1176C). Equally, the Lombard had allowed of the proposition pro-vided that the 'secundum' be interpreted as an expression of the unity of the di-vine person, who remains essentially unchanged in the Incarnation; cf. Nielsen 1982: 239, 254, and 304.

Nonetheless, theologians of this persuasion did not opt for one of the easy and ready-made solutions but earnestly strove to adjust their expositions to the new doctrinal situation.

One Parisian theologian belonging to this group remains anonymous; in fact, he is known only through a relatively short text which has been preserved in only one manuscript where it is bound together with material from Peter the Chanter's school.[6] In the text Peter the Chanter is cited once, as is Peter of Corbeil, who became bishop of Cambrai in 1177. Moreover, the author knows of Alexander's second condemnation inasmuch as he explicitly states that maintaining the infamous sentence is punishable by excommunication.[7] Since Peter of Corbeil is still termed "magister" in the text, it seems reasonable to assume that the text was written quite soon after the second condemnation.[8] This dating is further strengthened by the fact that the author is very keen to mark a division between two groups of scholars, who, nonetheless, appear to share the same general outlook. On one occasion, the first group is said to claim that in the Incarnation human nature makes Christ or the Word of God "humanatum", and that human nature does not cause or bring about a thing (*res*) in man. For this reason, in interpreting the statement "Christ as man is something" they stress that 'according' (*secundum*) should be interpreted to imply a concomitance and should never be taken in a causative sense.[9] As compared to this interpretation the view of the second group is less restrictive, inasmuch as they believe themselves able to block offending interpretations solely by means of supposition theory. However, the fundamental agreement between the two groups is conscientiously brought out by the author who proceeds to stress that both groups agree that in this context 'aliquid' should never be taken in an essential or substantial meaning since this would imply that the incarnate Christ would be both divine and human substance.[10]

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6 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, Cod. lat. 3477, fols. 3ra-4rb. Henceforth quoted as "Anon. Cant." Edition in *CIMAGL* 66 (1996).

7 Anon. Cant., Propositio 1.

8 Anon. Cant., Propositio 11.

9 Anon. Cant., Propositio 1. The model for this interpretation is clearly the so-called "Habitus" theory as it appears in the Lombard's exposition; cf. Nielsen 1982: 253 sqq.

10 Anon. Cant., Propositio 1.

The second example of this bifurcation occurs with regard to the statement "Christ is God and man". The first group strongly objects to the conjunction being taken copulatively, whereas they would agree to what they call an "aggregative" reading. The second group, however, is ready to accept the copulative reading of the conjunction, again blocking undesired side-effects of this recognition by means of supposition theory. Obviously both groups agree to avoid the implication that Christ has identical ontological relationships to his divine and human natures.[11] In a third case, the division between the two groups is on a clearly minor point of doctrine. It relates to the expansion of infinite nouns, and in this case too the first group represents a less sophisticated stance as compared to members of the second group, who operate with a strong distinction between person on the one hand and essence or substance on the other.[12]

Consequently, two features stand out in the author's description of his immediate intellectual environment. First, there is a pronounced agreement on fundamentals between the two groups. Secondly, in their view of Christ's human nature both groups are strikingly close to the interpretation of the Incarnation which was cultivated by the Lombard and his early school.[13] This strongly suggests that the anonymous author had close links to this school of thought, and that his text reflects how theologians of this persuasion attempted to bring their theory into concord with the papal condemnation in the years immediately after 1177.

3. Stephen Langton

In his "Quaestiones theologiae" Stephen Langton addresses the questions posed by the Incarnation on several occasions. This work, in which numerous questions appear in different stages of development, was in all probability never given its final form.[14] Inasmuch as it was heavily utilised by the Danish theologian and later archbishop, Andrew Sunesen, who after having taught in the

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11 Anon. Cant., Propositio 2.
12 Anon. Cant., Propositio 5.
13 Cf. Nielsen 1982: 279 sqq.
14 Cf. Quinto 1994: 90 sqq.

Parisian schools returned to Denmark in the early 1190s,[15] it appears that Langton's questions were available in written form around 1190.[16] This means that the work was the fruit of Langton's early teaching in Paris, which he is generally assumed to have commenced around 1180.[17]

In this context I shall look at three of Langton's questions dealing with Christology. The first question is entitled "De homine assumpto, et utrum Christus sit duo" and has been handed down in only one version.[18] It forms an obvious parallel to the text by the anonymous author from the Chanter's school. In this question Langton reveals strong ties with the Lombard's school. At the same time the question makes it evident that significant changes had taken place as compared to the earlier Lombard school.[19] The second and much shorter question "Utrum Christus sit filius adoptivus" is also extant in only one version. Its claim to interest lies primarily in the fact that it throws light on the way in which Langton utilises the tools of logic in answering one of the traditional questions of Christology. Finally, the third question deals with the thorny issue of Christ's ontological makeup in death. This had been one of the decidedly weak points in the theory of the Lombard's school, and one with which the mentor himself had been unable to come to grips.[20] In wrestling with this question Langton reveals some of the fundamental assumptions behind his assessment of the ontological status of Christ's human nature.

4. The teaching of theology in the 1180s

The texts provided by the anonymous pupil of the Chanter and by Langton share a number of distinctive features. In the first place, they appear to be closely associated with oral teaching taking place in the Parisian class-rooms. Even if the text by the anonymous author from the Chanter's school has undergone editorial

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15 See the introduction to Andreas Sunonis Filius *Hexaemeron*: 30 sqq.

16 Cf. Ebbesen 1987: 404.

17 Cf. Quinto 1994: 11-12.

18 Cf. Quinto 1994: 204.

19 Langton's association with the circle of Peter the Chanter is firmly established; see, e.g., Quinto 1994: 12-13, and the introduction in Petrus Lombardus *Sententiae*: 45* sqq.

20 Cf. Nielsen 1982: 274 sqq., 313 sqq., and 351 sqq.

work it still has a number of clearly oral features. Thus the author consistently uses the first person plural when presenting either a solution to a problem or replying to some objection. Occasionally he may emphasise the personal aspect by including the personal pronoun in the first person plural.[21] Moreover, in opening the discussion of some specific point the author sometimes directly addresses his audience and stipulates some temporal condition which they are asked to accept.[22]

With Langton the oral features are even more pronounced.[23] For example, after having given the solution to one tricky line of argument Langton tells the student opponent that he can really make things difficult for his adversary if he continues the discussion by raising the question of whether the incarnate Christ is similar to himself.[24] At several points Langton's text slips into dialogue form with one person asking questions and, presumably, Langton answering.[25]

This affinity to the class-room situation helps us form a picture of how the teaching of theology in the schools of Paris might have taken place in this period. The text provided by the anonymous scholar of the Chanter's school reveals that teaching on this part of Christology was centred around particular Christological "key-sentences". In the text they have not been spelled out but they are easily identifiable. In all there are eleven statements put up for debate,[26]

1) Christus est unum et aliud
2) Christus est Deus et homo
3) Filius est homo, qui non est Pater
4) Deus incipit esse homo
5) Homo est non-homo

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21 Anon. Cant., Propositiones 5 and 8.

22 Anon. Cant., Propositio 4 ("Item, simus in instanti incarnationis ..."); Propositio 6 ("Simus ergo in proximo instanti ante incarnationem ..."); Propositio 7 ("Contra. Simus ante incarnationem ...").

23 This holds good for the question "De homine assumpto ...". The questions on Christ as adopted son and on Christ as man in death are far more polished literary products and bear few oral traces; for the latter see, e.g., "Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo passionis", § 4 ("Simus in triduo ...").

24 Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", § 3.

25 Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", §§ 16, 18.

26 In the edition these key-sentences have been added as headings and placed in square brackets.

6)   Filius desinit esse non-homo
7)   Iste homo est
8)   Christus potuit assumere duo homines
9)   Christus assumat corpus et animam
10) Deus potest assumere personam Petri
11) Utrum separatus a deitate homo assumptus sit alius homo quam prius

In Langton's question on the assumed man a far greater number of Christological key-sentences are involved. Due to the often truncated nature of the debate as it has been recorded, it is in several cases difficult to identify with precision how a particular sentence was phrased. Tentatively one might suggest a list like the following,[27]

1)   Utrum Christus sit duo
2)   Pater est maior Filio
3)   Filius Dei est maior se
4)   Filius hominis est tantus quantus Filius Dei
5)   Factus homo Christus factus est aliquid
6)   Filius Dei fit substantia rationalis individua
7)   Christus fit haec res, quae est aeterna
8)   Christus homo loquitur
9)   Homo assumptus est
10) Christus fecit se
11) Christus potuit assumere Petrum
12) Pater potest incarnari
13) Christus potuit assumere angelum
14) Christus potuit assumere aliam animam et aliud corpus
15) Species "homo" dicitur de Christo
16) Christus est duo
17) Christus creavit se
18) Filius Dei potuit assumere te
19) Christus potuit esse plures homines
20) Homo assumptus est Verbum Dei
21) Christus homo loquitur
22) Homo assumptus est Filius Dei
23) Homo assumptus est omnipotens

Furthermore, both texts disclose that oral teaching had a form which to a large extent must have resembled sophismatical disputations. In the first place, the anonymous member of the

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27 In the edition the subdivisions of the text have been flagged by numerals added in square brackets.

Chanter's school uses the "positio impossibilis"[28] without for that reason feeling compelled either to introduce this device to his audience or to excuse his putting it to use in a theological context. In the same vein he alludes to and utilises a sophisma centred on the statement "Socrates in eo quod est animal, convenit Burnello",[29] which he finds well suited for illuminating his point. Equally, in his question on the assumed man Langton alludes to a sophismatical disputation on "Sortes loquitur de animali, de quo loquitur Plato, et de animali, de quo non loquitur Plato" as well as to the sophisma "Quicumque homo erit, est",[30] which he fits seamlessly into the discussion.

Secondly, the discussion as it unfolds in these texts bears a markedly grammatico-logical imprint inasmuch as it centres around the analysis of statements. To this end a large number of conceptual tools are employed of which the great majority have their origins in the faculty of arts. In general the strategy pursued in these text is comparatively straightforward: a Christological key-statement is broken down into its constituent parts, which are subsequently analysed with regard to grammatical congruence, semantical import, and logical properties such as intention and denotation.

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28 In Propositio 5 he says "Similiter pono per impossibile quod una essentia sit homo et asinus ...", and alludes to this again in Propositio 7. Similarly, in Propositio 11 the question of whether the assumed man would be a new person if his union with divinity were dissolved, is characterised as something that should be understood "per impossibile". Cf. Martin 1992: 123 sqq.; and Knuuttila 1997. The "positio" of a union between a human being and a donkey is also known from the so-called "Tractatus Emmeranus de impossibili positione" (Anonymus Emmeranus: 120). Judging from the testimony of Praepositinus, in his *Summa "Qui producit ventos"*, it was allowed to reject a "positio" that could never obtain: "Quod ponitur, quod anima et caro ita unitae separentur a Verbo, dicitur, quod positio est impossibilis. Et tamen si recipiatur, respondetur ...." (Vat. lat. 1174, fol. 51ra, corrected against a preliminary edition of the third book of the *"Qui producit ventos"*, which Prof. Stephen Brown, Boston College, most kindly made available to me.)
29 Anon. Cant., Propositio 1.
30 Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", §§ 1 and 14. Langton's more polished questions are purged of such remnants of oral teaching.

5. The basic issue

In their discussions of the questions posed by the Incarnation both the anonymous pupil of the Chanter and Langton place themselves directly in the tradition of the Lombard whose exposition in the third book of the *Sentences* determines their approach to the subject.

In expounding the mystery of the Incarnation the Lombard had distinguished between three schools of thought. As seen by the Lombard, the main problem common to these three theories, and for which they should be regarded as solutions, consists in deciding whether God can be said to have become something (*aliquid*) inasmuch as He became man in the Incarnation. With the Lombard this is tantamount to asking whether God or the Son of God became something that He had not been from eternity, *viz.*, man or soul and body, in the sense that soul and body became part of the divine person's being.[31]

The first theory presented by the Lombard is the so-called "Homo Assumptus" theory. According to this theory, a human being, consisting of soul and body, just like other men, was united with the Word of God, and thereby started to be the Word, just as he started to be God. This man, however, did not become God in the sense that he became divine nature, rather he became the divine person assuming human nature. Conversely, God became human substance, consisting of soul and body, even though there was no question of a change in nature. One of the salient features of this theory, in the Lombard's view, is its insistence that God really became something, as human substance or soul and body became the same person as the Word and God. Therefore, adherents of this theory maintain that the reciprocal predication of 'God' and 'man' and cognate predications are to be interpreted quite literally (*vere*).

Obviously, the Lombard does not favour this theory, and his main objection to it is that on this view God is something which is not eternal, and that, consequently, an incongruity arises between God and the divine substance, since a substance that differs from the divine would in this case be God.

The second theory as presented by the Lombard is the so-called "Subsistence" theory. According to this view Christ as incarnate

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31   For the following, cf. Nielsen 1982: 246 sqq.

person consists of the two natures or the three substances, divinity, soul, and body. On this basis proponents of the theory maintain that the person who prior to the Incarnation was simple, after the Incarnation became a person composed of divinity and humanity, so that where, prior to the Incarnation, this person existed in merely one nature, after the Incarnation he subsisted in, as well as by virtue of, two natures. According to the Lombard, however, several adherents of this theory are reluctant to use the expression "persona composita ex duabus naturis" and prefer to say that the divine person became human substance consisting of soul and body and is composite insofar as he became a human "subsistens", whereas he remained simple insofar as he is the Word.[32]

The third theory, the so-called "Habitus" theory, maintains, according to the Lombard, that the mode of the Incarnation is to be found in the "habitus" that arises when soul and body are united with the person and nature of the Word. For this reason God may be said to have become man "secundum habitum", which is to say that the Word was clothed in soul and body. In agreement with this the adherents of this theory interpret the reciprocal predication of 'God' and 'man' in such a way that both the statement "Deus est homo" and the statement "Homo est Deus" signify that God relates to man habitually (*est habens*). Accordingly, adherents of the theory interpret the central Christological statements in such a fashion that they do not imply that there is an identity of being between the thing that is designated by the subject term and the object for which the predicate term stands. The ultimate foundation of this view is, evidently, a view of the ontological makeup of Christ according to which human nature does not enter into the being of the eternal person. As compared to the divine being of the Word human nature acquired at the Incarnation may be compared with an accidental determination. In other terms, this conception disallows that Christ or the divine person

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32 The Lombard's interpretation of the second theory is highly intricate and marked by ambiguity. The reason for this is that the second theory has its model in Gilbert of Poitiers and his followers, and the Lombard disregards Gilbert's formal ontology as well as his modal conception of "persona". In the final analysis the Lombard's exposition is misleading inasmuch as it brings the second theory into at least partial concord with the "Habitus" theory with respect to the fundamental view that human nature does not contribute to the actual being or essence of the person; cf. Nielsen 1982: 256 sqq.

of the Word became man "essentialiter". As a natural corollary of this, adherents of the theory are obliged to maintain that Christ's human soul and body cannot be said to have come together so as to form a substance or an integral whole of which soul and body are parts.[33]

6. The logical foundations

In dealing with the Christological key-statements put up for debate both the anonymous pupil of the Chanter and Langton base themselves on a limited number of presuppositions and rules.

Not surprisingly it is absolutely fundamental that propositions are predicative and consist of a subject term and a predicate term.[34] It is further held that, in general, the subject term is a noun, and that it has the function of denoting the actual thing for which the statement can be verified. The predicate term, on the other hand, is ordinarily an adjective or an adjectival expression that indicates a form, which is claimed to belong to the thing indicated by the subject term. Consequently, supposition or denotation is primarily linked to the subject term.[35]

Nonetheless, this is merely how things often work. The situation is complicated by the fact that the two authors are willing to allow that even predicate terms may denote an external thing or have supposition. Whether one should look for something denoted by the predicate term is decided on an individual basis. The fact of the matter is that predicate terms are ambiguous. They may be interpreted in two ways; they can be read as either substantives or as

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33   Cf. Nielsen 1982: 264-265 and 313 sqq.

34   Sentences which consist of a noun as subject term and a finite verb are analysed along the same lines. Thus Langton views verbs as indicating properties which are called "res verbi". With regard to the statement that God creates, the objection is raised that the verb 'creare' implies a temporal effect by way of consignification and thus allows of "mixing" the temporal and the eternal. This Langton counters by maintaining that the temporal effect is not posited in the quality implied by the verb ("in re verbi") but is extraneous to this property ("De homines assumpto ...", § 7); cf. Langton, "Utrum Christus sit filius adoptivus", § 4.

35   Both the anonymous pupil of the Chanter and Langton use the technical term 'copulare' instead of 'praedicare'; cf. Ebbesen 1987: 410 sqq. Equally, both authors employ the term 'appellatio' in its late twelfth-century meaning; see, e.g., Anon. Cant., Propositio 6; Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", § 14; *id.*, "Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo passionis", § 1; and cf. Maierù 1972: 85 sqq.

adjectives. If a predicate term is interpreted in the substantival sense it is true to say that the term is supponing for something in the world of "id quod"s – to use the Boethian terminology. If, on the other hand, a predicate term is interpreted in the adjectival sense it holds good that the term points to a property which is either claimed or denied to be inherent in the thing pointed to by the subject term.[36]

How does one decide whether a predicate term is to be taken in an adjectival or in a substantival sense? An obvious answer would of course be to look at the grammatical form of the word used as predicate term. This easy solution is, however, not the one endorsed by these authors. It would restrict the scope of analysis far too severely. To them it is not at all decisive whether, from a grammatical point of view, an actual predicate term is a substantive or an adjective. The reason for this is that grammatical form is considered to be only a surface phenomenon. If, in a particular sentence, a substantive is placed as predicate term, whereas from the point of view of meaning an adjective is required, one may "adjectivise" the predicate term. This will not change the sentence on the surface level but alter it significantly on the semantic level. Conversely, if an adjective is placed as predicate term whereas the proper meaning of the sentence requires a substantive, one may "substantivise" the predicate term. Consequently, the only criterion for deciding the proper sense of the predicate term is the context.

In debating the ontological constitution of Christ the authors focus on the key-sentence "Christus est Deus et homo". In this instance, the substantives 'Deus' and 'homo' are placed as predicate terms, and if they are then taken at face value, according to the pupil of the Chanter, one would be entitled to infer "Ergo Deus et homo sunt Christus". This inference is, however, illegitimate inasmuch as it would mean splitting Christ into two. For this reason, in the original sentence, it is required that 'Deus' and 'homo' be interpreted in an adjectival sense so that they indicate natures that are predicated of the one Christ.[37]

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36 Langton extends this analysis so as to include the subject term as well; cf. below, section 9.

37 Anon. Cant., Propositio 2; Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", §§ 7, 16, 23; "Utrum Christus sit filius adoptivus", § 9; "Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo passionis", § 4.

Another, and more complex, sentence illustrates the same point. Talking of the incarnate Christ one may, according to the anonymous pupil of the Chanter, say "Christus est simplex et compositum". If the terms 'simplex' and 'compositum' are read as adjectives then the statement should be rejected for the sole reason that it does not conform to the rules of grammar; it is incongruous. Equally, if the terms 'simplex' and 'compositum' are substantivised, the sentence should be denied inasmuch as it then implies that Christ is both a simple and a composite thing, for which these predicate terms would suppone. And this is simply false according to the author, inasmuch as the person of Christ is not both a divine and a human substance.[38] One may, on the other hand, view the two terms as substantives but this does not salvage the sentence, which again would imply that Christ is two things. As substantives, however, these terms may also be adjectivised, and, at long last, a sense is obtained in which the author is willing to grant the sentence. In this case the words 'simplex' and 'compositum' are attributed to Christ on account of the twin natures of deity and humanity, which are simple and composite respectively.[39]

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38 The anonymous pupil of the Chanter is quite explicit on this point. Early in his text the author claims that there is nothing out of the ordinary in maintaining that Christ's human nature does not result in a human substance or a human "quid", since the very same should be said of Christ's divinity. Later on, however, he unreservedly admits of the possibility of talking of Christ's divine nature as a "quid" inasmuch as the statement "Christus est hoc, et illud non est Pater" is rejected with the justification that the "hoc" points to the divine essence, which, of course, is common to both divine persons. As the divine substance may be demonstrated by way of a demonstrative pronoun in the neuter it is evident why a premiss like "Filius est haec substantia, quae non est Pater" does not warrant a conclusion such as "Ergo Filius est aliquid, quod non est Pater"; in the premiss 'substantia' points to the divine essence together with the Son's personal property, whereas in the conclusion the 'aliquid' denotes solely the divine substance which is common to all three divine persons (Anon. Cant., Propositio 1) Consequently, the reason why divinity does not result in a divine "quid", is quite different from the reason why Christ's human nature does not result in a human "quid". Whereas the simplicity of divinity prevents the divine persons from having each a proper and single substance, the lack of a human "quid" in Christ is due to the way in which Christ relates to human nature.

39 Anon. Cant., Propositio 2. Langton does not deal with this particular sentence.

7. "Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid"

The Chanter pupil's reasons for rejecting the sentence "Christ is God and man" in the sense that Christ is both divine and human substance are further elucidated by his treatment of the sentence that Christ as man is something.

Adherents of competing theories, such as the "Homo Assumptus" and the "Subsistence" theories, would willingly accept that Christ is both divine and human substance. For this reason they should, according to the pupil of the Chanter, be ready to grant an argument such as the following,

> Humanitas et deitas faciunt in Deo quid et quid,
> ergo faciunt unum quid, vel unum quid et aliud quid.[40]

In this sense they are obliged to recognise that Christ may be said to be two.[41]

In dealing with this touchstone question of the period the anonymous pupil of the Chanter is, as already mentioned, very careful to take exception to the interpretation cultivated in the early school of the Lombard. Thus, he flatly denies that Christ's humanity should be compared to an accidental property, just as he does not see any reason for distinguishing between various meanings of the word 'secundum' in the statement "Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid".[42]

On the other hand, this does not imply that he agrees with the arguments of the competing theories. On the contrary, address-

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40 Anon. Cant., Propositio 1.

41 Historically speaking, this is a highly inaccurate representation of the "Subsistence" theory since adherents of this view would not agree to a simple juxtaposition of Christ's divine and human substances. The reason for this refusal is not based on Christ's human nature or substance, but on the consideration that, because of its absolute simplicity, divinity should not be viewed on the level of substance in the sense of "id quod"; instead, it should be viewed as a form or an "id quo". Cf. Nielsen 1982: 354 sqq. In his *Summa "Qui producit ventos"*, Praepositinus, whose association with the Porretan school is well-known, puts this very succinctly by stating that though Christ is God and man, he is not two substances inasmuch as "humanitas ... substantia est subiecti, deitas quasi substantia subiecti" (Vat. lat. 1174, fol. 52vb).

42 Anon. Cant., Propositio 1 ("... quemadmodum grammatica et musica non faciunt in uno subiecto unum quale et aliud quale, sed faciunt unum quale et quale. Non tamen est prorsus simile ...").

ing the argument given above he observes that it violates the rules of supposition. In the antecedent the two 'quid's are intended to denote different things, but when applied to Christ they are clearly equivalent to the words 'Deus' and 'homo', which stand for only one thing. On this basis one might expect that the pupil of the Chanter would accept an inference such as

> Humanitas facit quid, deitas facit quid,
> ergo deitas et humanitas faciunt unum quid.[43]

Nonetheless, he flatly rejects this inference, and, in agreement with the earlier Lombard school, he remarks that the statement that Christ as man is something is unacceptable if the word 'aliquid' is taken to denote an essence, which again means a substance or, in the Boethian terminology, an "id quod". If, however, the 'aliquid' is given a broad signification so as to designate both essences and forms, the statement is true.[44]

Elaborating on this, the anonymous Chanter pupil proceeds to explain that irrespective of whether one talks of Christ's divinity or his humanity the terms 'God' or 'man' as predicated of Christ can only have simple supposition.[45] This means that in statements such as "Christus est aliquid secundum quod homo", "Christus humanitate est aliquid", and "Christus deitate est aliquid" the word 'aliquid' designates solely a nature or property which is claimed to belong to Christ. For this reason it is not permitted to "make a descent" to some concrete instance of this nature. Such an illegitimate instantiation may, as the author explains, take place in one of two ways: Either by the appending of a relative clause so that one says "Christus secundum quod homo est quid,

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43   Anon. Cant., Propositio 1.

44   Anon. Cant., Propositio 1, "Notandum autem quod, sicut ipsi (*scil.*, the early proponents of the Lombard's school) dicunt, haec est falsa "Christus est aliquid secundum quod homo", si haec dictio 'aliquid' sumatur essentialiter, et non est alia essentia secundum quod homo. Sed secundum quod vera est, accipitur haec dictio 'aliquid,' secundum quod est terminus omnia continens et habet se tam ad essentias quam ad formas". Perhaps the discussion of the Christological 'aliquid' is a point of departure for the later inclusion of 'aliquid' among the transcendentals. To my knowledge, 'aliquid' was never numbered among the transcendentals in the twelfth century. I owe thanks to Gyula Klima, University of Notre Dame, for a stimulating discussion of this point.

45   Cf. above, note 38.

quod non est Pater", or by making a reference to the 'aliquid' by way of a pronoun as in the sentence "Christus deitate est aliquid, et humanitate est illud vel aliud".[46] If, nevertheless, somebody should venture to do so, one is entitled to reject the resulting sentence as being simply "incongruous".[47] In a later passage, however, the author describes this kind of mistake as a fallacious inference from terms posited in a natural sense to the same terms posited in a significative sense, which he simply terms 'equivocation'.[48]

To this line of reasoning the objection is raised that this interpretation of 'aliquid' seems to do away with Christ's human substance altogether. Inasmuch as Christ must be divine substance it should be possible to state that Christ is this substance, *viz.*, the divine, and that as man Christ must be some different substance.[49] To this the anonymous Chanter pupil replies by rejecting the statement "Christus est hoc secundum quod homo" for the sole reason that by its very nature the demonstrative pronoun refers to a substance and thus cannot be taken as referring to Christ's human nature. Moreover, in talking of Christ on the level of substance one should bear in mind that the word 'substance' may be used in one of two ways. It may be used as either a predicamental term, and in this case 'substance' has the same scope as 'person', for which reason it is true to say that Christ is a different substance

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46 Anon. Cant., Propositio 1, "Et ideo non debet fieri in eo descensus .... Similiter ad talem terminum non debet reddi relativum". The Anon. Cant. does not employ the grammatical distinction between "relatio simplex" and "relatio personalis", which would have been well suited for making this point; cf. Kneepkens 1976 and 1977.

47 Apparently, the Anon. Cant. would endorse a very broad definition of "congruous speech" so as to cover not only grammatical completeness (see Anon. Cant., Propositio 2) but also logical soundness; cf. Ebbesen 1981: 91 sqq.

48 Anon. Cant., Propositio 6, "... a terminis naturaliter positis ad eosdem positos significative facto sic processu semper incidit aequivocatio". Inasmuch as the author links equivocation to variation in supposition it is not surprising to find that he maintains that a word such as 'canis' with its various significations is strictly speaking different nouns and differents parts of speech, though materially it is only one (Anon. Cant., Propositio 8). A possible parallel to this denial of ordinary equivocation is the well-known saying of the so-called Melun school that no noun is equivocal; see Ebbesen 1992: 63.

49 The run of the argument is complicated by the fact that a possible counter-argument to this line of reasoning is appended by means of a simple 'item'. However, the author's solution takes both arguments into account and, in effect, comes out in favour of the counter-argument.

from the Father. Or 'substance' may be taken as a general term covering all sorts of objects, and in this sense one should deny that Christ is a different substance from the Father.[50] Apparently, the author conceives of this line of demarcation as being signalled not only by semantics but also by purely grammatical differences. Thus it seems that, in general, masculine and feminine forms of nouns and pronouns indicate predicamental terms whereas the neuter form reveals that the general meaning is intended.[51]

The further objection is raised that in rejecting the inference from "Filius est homo, et ille non est Pater" to "Ergo Filius est aliquid, quod non est Pater" the anonymous Chanter pupil has sinned against the rules of grammar. According to current grammatical doctrine, relative pronouns[52] are generally said to refer to the supposite of the corresponding noun, i.e. to the thing in its capacity to take on various properties. For this reason it seems incongruous that, when talking of the divine persons, we should be forced to abandon the ordinary rules of grammar in order to maintain that persons who share the same essence can be talked about as different supposites. One might have expected the anonymous Chanter pupil to reply to this line of reasoning by drawing a distinction between created persons and divine persons. This easy, but potentially dangerous, solution is, however, not the one adopted by the author. Instead, he focuses on the nouns 'father' and 'son'. By nature these words are, he claims, personal in a substantial sense, which is to say that they can only

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50 In his discussion of whether God started to be man, the anonymous Chanter pupil draws a distinction with regard to the expression 'aliquid rationale', which can be taken to mean the thing talked about together with its various forms or the thing referred to without its formal principles (Anon. Cant., Propositio 4). In the present context it would seem that the author envisages a similar distinction. Thus as a complete thing with all its properties Christ is a substance that is different from the Father, who, of course, does not possess the personal property of the Son. However, with regard to basic being there is no difference between the Father and the Son or Christ because they are both God, and taking 'substance' in this sense one cannot say that Christ is a different substance from the Father. Cf. Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", § 6.

51 Cf. above note 38. An obvious parallel to this rule is found in the so-called "Tractatus Emmeranus de impossibili positione" (Anonymus Emmeranus: 121, ll. 5-9).

52 The discussion centers around the demonstrative pronoun 'ille', which in medieval parlance is classified as a relative pronoun.

designate persons. Other nouns such as 'soldier' or 'bishop' do not share this feature; they may designate persons but this is completely extraneous to their proper natures. For this reason, when referring to objects designated by substantially personal terms, relative pronouns are flexed so as to refer not to the neutral supposits but to the supposites together with their properties.[53]

This particular feature of personal nouns and pronouns is further elaborated on by the anonymous pupil of the Chanter when analysing the sentence "Homo est non-homo". The problem at hand is quite simple. Inasmuch as the divine essence qua the Son is man, and since the same essence qua the Father is non-man, one would seem entitled to infer that man is non-man. According to the anonymous pupil of the Chanter, however, this unfortunate contradiction can be dismantled if it is kept in mind that personal terms cannot stand for essences or substances. For this reason personal terms such as 'iste homo' and 'iste non-homo' cannot rightfully be applied to the divine essence but must necessarily denote persons.[54]

8. Person and substance according to the anonymous pupil of the Chanter

It is evident that according to the Chanter pupil a strong distinction should be drawn between person and substance. Obviously, this holds good in the case of God. Equally, it is of central importance for reaching a proper understanding of Christ who as a person is not only divine but also human, even though on the level of substance or "quid" he is divine but not human substance. On the level of pure creatures the distinction appears to be of importance as well. It is reflected in grammar through the distinction between personal and essential nouns and pronouns.[55] On the level of semantics it calls for the distinction between substantives that are personal in a substantial or primary sense and substantives that are only secondarily personal.

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53 Anon. Cant., Propositio 3.

54 Anon. Cant., Propositio 5. The same conception is central to Langton; cf. below, section 9.

55 One might venture to assume that the author would regard the distinction between pronouns in masculine and femine form, on the one hand, and pronouns in the neuter, on the other, as reflecting the difference between the personal and the essential.

When it comes to describing this distinction between person and substance the anonymous pupil of the Chanter is regrettably taciturn.[56] Nonetheless, the author does broach the subject in discussing some of his Christological key-sentences. Firstly, he adduces that Christ might have assumed Peter without for that reason becoming Peter since Peter's personality would be absorbed by and disappear into Christ's personality.[57] Moreover, in a "positio de impossibili" it is asked, whether the dissolution of the union between the divine Word and Christ's human nature would cause the deserted human being to be the same or to become another. The author refrains from presenting a solution of his own to this question. Instead he adduces the opinion of Peter the Chanter whom he alleges to have believed that the human being would remain unchanged except for the fact that he would become a person upon being separated from the Son of God. Along the same lines Peter of Corbeil is reported to have stressed that being a person would be accidental for this particular human being. Due to the brevity of the report it is admittedly very difficult to say what lies at the bottom of this reasoning.[58]

Related to this topic is the discussion of whether Christ would be two human beings if he assumed, e.g., two souls and two bodies. Since the two bodies might be of different sizes and colours it could be argued that this situation would allow of ascribing contradictory predicates to Christ. The solution to this problem the anonymous pupil of the Chanter finds in a simile. Thus he states that just as a word such as 'canis' is materially only one whereas its different meanings cause it to be different words and parts of

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56 This is generally true of members of the Lombard's school; cf. Nielsen 1982: 324 sqq. According to the Chanter, drawing a strong distinction between person and essence or substance was one of the distinguishing marks of the so-called "nominales"; see the text adduced by Ebbesen and Iwakuma 1992: 185-186; cf. Ebbesen 1992: 70.

57 Anon. Cant., Propositio 10. This so-called "juridical" solution enjoyed a certain popularity in the late twelfth century; cf. Landgraf 1953: 94 sqq.; and Nielsen 1982: 318.

58 Anon. Cant., Propositio 11. One might venture to guess that the underlying conviction is that Christ's human nature or soul and body would come together to form a substance upon being separated from the Word of God, and that as united they would fulfill the requirements for constituting a human person. Deliberations along these lines are apparent in Langton's question "Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo passionis".

speech,[59] and just as the divine persons are the same essence with-
out the persons thereby being confounded, so, on the given
premises, Christ would be different human beings (*diversi*) with-
out for that reason being different things (*diversa*).[60] At first
glance, this explanation appears rather opaque. What the similes
are intended to convey, however, is undoubtedly that, from the
point of view of nature, one assumed set of soul and body would
not be different from the other; they would be identical. They
would, however, be distinguishable by way of their accidents (e.g.,
colour and size) and for this reason be "diversi"; this is presum-
ably the reason for the author's adducing the personal properties
of the divine persons as elucidating parallels. What is less appar-
ent, however, is how these different sets of soul and body could be
carriers of accidental determinations inasmuch as, on the au-
thor's view, Christ's body and soul – or diverse sets of bodies and
souls united to the divine person – do not form human "quid"s or
substances. Unfortunately, the author does not elaborate on this
and leaves the reader with the impression that, according to his
theory, the human side of Christ differs significantly from ordi-
nary human beings in its ontological constitution.[61]

9. Christ as person and substance
according to Langton

Langton's exposition of the Incarnation has several of its salient
points in common with the interpretation provided by the anony-
mous pupil of the Chanter. At the same time Langton's text makes
it clear that the interpretation presented by the anonymous
Chanter pupil had prompted adjustments and refinements.

In common with the anonymous pupil of the Chanter, Langton
attempts to steer a middle course between the so-called "Subsis-

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59 Cf. above, note 48.

60 Anon. Cant., Propositio 8.

61 The ease with which theologians of the Lombard's school accepted that
Christ's human nature carries accidents without for that reason constituting a sub-
stance has several causes. In the first place, this would seem possible inasmuch as
soul and body could still function as primary carriers of human accidents. Second-
ly, accidents without a supporting substance are well-known from the Eucharist
where transsubstantiation brings about that the accidents of bread and wine sub-
sist without any foundation; cf. Petrus Lombardus *Sententiae* 304.

tence" theory and the original "Habitus" theory. In opposition to
the original "Subsistence" theory, however, formal ontology plays
hardly any part in either author's interpretation. This is clearly
brought out by Langton's exposition of the different unions in
Christ. As Langton explains, Christ's death implied the dissolution
of the union between Christ's uncreated and created natures, and
for this reason during the "triduum" Christ was not man.[62] Subse-
quently Langton explicates that the second person in the Trinity,
the Son of God, was united to neither soul nor body during the
three days of death whereas the divine nature retained its union
with both soul and body. This union, Langton maintains, consisted
in protecting Christ's body against corruption and in conferring
power on Christ's soul so as to enable it to descend to the realm of
the dead and liberate the righteous souls kept there.[63] Moreover,
Langton is willing to concede that Christ's death meant not only
the dissolution between the Word of God and soul and body but
also the separation of soul and body.[64] Christ's human nature as a
formal principle is given no part to play in Langton's exposition,
and he consistently views human nature as being identical with
soul and body in their mutual association.[65]

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62 Langton, "Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo passionis", § 3.

63 Langton, "Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo passionis", § 5.

64 Langton, "Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo passionis", § 1. Admitting
that some kind of union existed between Christ's soul and body is nothing out of
the ordinary for members of the Lombard's school; cf. Nielsen 1982: 314 sqq.

65 Langton states that Christ could not be called a "res naturae creatae" if he
joined a human soul to himself, whereas he would be a "res naturae creatae" if he
united the nature of a human soul to himself ("Utrum Christus fuerit homo in
triduo passionis", § 7). This does not militate against the proposed reading of
Langton's ontology. What Langton has in mind in this passage is a completely dif-
ferent distinction from that between the soul as "id quod" and "id quo". In fact, at
the close of § 4 in the question on Christ as man in death Langton explicates that
if Christ joined a soul to himself he could be said to be a "soul" solely on the con-
dition that he had united this soul as part of himself. In other words, from Lang-
ton's point of view it is the nature of the union between the Word of God and, e.g.,
a human soul which determines whether or not Christ assumed a soul or the na-
ture of a soul. Furthermore, Langton seems to have experienced severe problems
with the distinction between parts and their natures. Thus in the question on the
assumed man Langton maintains that Christ could assume a soul though he could
not assume the nature of soul since this would entail that Christ would become a
soul; and this cannot be for the sole reason that a soul cannot be a person inas-
much as it is not incommunicable; "De homine assumpto ...", § 13; cf. *ibid.*, § 18.

Equally, Langton is in agreement with the anonymous pupil of the Chanter when it comes to answering the question of whether Christ could be several human beings if he assumed more than one set of soul and body.[66]

Furthermore, Langton agrees with the anonymous pupil of the Chanter in his recognition that one may not use personal pronouns when speaking of Christ as man inasmuch as Christ's human nature is not a person but something that is united to Christ as divine person.[67]

On the latter point, however, Langton seems very much to contradict himself inasmuch as, in one passage, he maintains that "tertiae opinionis veritas (*scil.*, the "Subsistence" theory) habet, quod supposito illo homine supponitur Filius Dei".[68] Nonetheless, in a later passage Langton claims that "... quia supposito isto homine non supponitur persona".[69] This contradiction is, however, only apparent and should be dissolved through a distinction between reading pronouns in either a substantival or an adjectival sense. This kind of solution Langton propounds at the end of the question on Christ as adopted son. Thus he states that, when talking of Christ as man, the statement "Istud fuit, et ab aeterno fuit verum istud esse" is ambiguous. If the 'istud' is read in an adjectival sense, the sentence should be affirmed. If, on the other hand, the 'istud' is taken in a substantival sense, then the sentence should be rejected inasmuch as it would imply that the thing to which the 'istud' points is an eternal thing.[70] The implication of this is that the 'istud' can be understood in the following two ways: either, in the adjectival sense, as "that thing which is that" so that

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66   This problem is dealt with in Langton's "De homine assumpto ...", § 14, and is addressed again in § 19.

67   Langton, "... demonstrato Filio Dei nihil est dictu 'Iste homo est', quia supposito Filio Dei non supponitur homo, sicut nec eo demonstrato bene dicitur 'Ista essentia est'." ("De homine assumpto ...", § 15); cf. "... sed per pronomen 'iste' non nisi persona (*scil.* demonstratur), et est personale, et esse istum est esse quem vel personam. Unde nihil est dictu demonstrato lapide 'Iste est', similiter nec 'Ista est'." (*ibid.*, § 4). For the rather telling 'bene' of the first quotation, cf. above, note 38.

68   Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", § 1.

69   Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", § 15. Langton admits that in this respect Christ as man is an exceptional case inasmuch as "Iste est" can be said of every other human being.

70   Langton, "Utrum Christus sit filius adoptivus", § 9.

'istud' is read as an apposition to an implied noun, which refers to some thing or person which is claimed to be eternal. Or it may be read in the substantival sense, i.e. as simply 'that thing', in which case the thing directly pointed to by 'istud' is said to be eternal. And, as a matter of course, this latter meaning is false since Christ's humanity is not eternal.[71]

This dual interpretation of personal pronouns is probably the reason why Langton refrains from confronting the statement that Christ as man is something.[72] Since nothing would prevent Langton from imposing a dual reading on 'aliquid', he would be at liberty to admit that Christ became something, provided, of course, that 'aliquid' was not taken in a substantival sense. Thus Langton has dispensed with the solution provided by the anonymous pupil of the Chanter according to which 'aliquid' has simple supposition and does not allow of instantiation. And, without any risk of compromising the incarnate Christ as divine and eternal person, Langton is at liberty to use an expression such "iste homo, qui est Filius Dei" which could never obtain with the anonymous pupil of the Chanter.[73]

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71 This distinction also appears in Praepositinus' *Summa "Qui producit ventos"* in an argument used by theologians of the Lombard's school against the opposing theories, "Item, quaeritur ab illis, qui tenent primam vel mediam sententiam (*scil.*, the "Homo Assumptus" and the "Subsistence" theories), utrum hoc sit concedendum 'Christus incepit esse hoc'.

"Quod sic probatur. Christus est aliquid, quod non est Pater, et non semper fuit aliquid, quod non sit Pater. Ergo incipit vel incepit esse aliquid, quod non est Pater. Ergo hoc demonstrato homine Christo vel aliud. Sed non aliud. Ergo incipit vel incepit esse hoc.

"Solutio. Dialectici vario modo consueverunt respondere ad hanc propositionem 'Iste heri fuit hoc album' posito, quod modo sit albus, heri niger. Qui hanc dant, non recipiunt hanc 'Ipse incepit esse hic homo', immo ab aeterno fuit hic homo. Tamen non sequitur 'Ergo fuit homo' vel 'fuit aliquis homo', quia 'hic' substantive accipitur, et 'homo' est determinativum. Et est sensus 'Fuit hic, qui est homo'. Cum dicitur 'Fuit aliquis homo', esset sensus, quod tunc aliqua humanitas ei infuisset.

"Qui vero hanc negant 'Christus heri fuit hoc album', debent dare hanc 'Christus incepit esse hoc'. Et est sensus 'Christus incepit esse substantia constituta ex carne et anima', sed non incepit esse hic homo, quia 'hic' solam personam notat. Tamen incepit esse homo. Et hoc nobis magis placet." (Vat. lat. 1174, fol. 53ra, partially corrected against the preliminary edition mentioned above in note 28).

Much later the distinction surfaces in William of Auxerre's *Summa Aurea* where in an argument it is said, "... unde si hoc pronomen 'iste' teneatur adiective ita ut

This deviation from the course followed by the anonymous pupil of the Chanter does not, however, imply that Langton has abandoned the fundamental perspective characteristic of the Lombard's school. This transpires not least from Langton's analysis of self-referential statements of which the incarnate Christ is the subject.

This issue, which is of importance for the interpretation of Scripture, Langton addresses as he focuses on the saying of Christ "Ego exivi a Patre" (John 16.28). As Christ does not wish to trick his disciples, one may, according to Langton, further stipulate that Christ does not speak in a figurative sense. This raises the question of what the 'ego' actually refers to. On the one hand, it is evident that the Son of God does not have corporeal organs with which he could utter human sound. On the other hand, it is quite evident that the Christ of the Gospels makes use of human language and talks about himself. In solving this problem Langton introduces a distinction. When applied to the incarnate Christ and taken in its straightforward meaning a statement such as "Aliquis proprie loquitur" should be denied as false. Obviously, 'aliquis' would have to refer to Christ as divine person, but being able to utter human speech does not follow from being divine.[74] Nonetheless, the state-

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'homo' sit terminus subiectus, et per pronomen fiat demonstratio personae, incongrua est ista 'Iste homo est'. Sed si haec dictio 'iste' teneatur substantive, credo quod recipienda, dummodo iste terminus 'homo' teneatur adiective. Similiter supposito hoc pronomine 'iste' personaliter, nihil est dictu 'Iste est' demonstrato filio hominis. Tantum enim valet 'iste' quantum 'haec persona'. Unde incongrua est haec demonstratio sicut haec demonstrata divina natura vel essentia" (Guillelmi Altissiodorensis *Summa Aurea*: 44); the punctuation has been slightly changed. For the "Iste est" said of Christ as man, cf. above, note 67.

72 Langton only touches on this issue in "De homine assumpto ...", § 5.

73 Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", § 21. Another difference between the two authors is to be found in the fact that Langton substituted the so-called "juridical" conception of person for a modal explanation. Thus he maintains that the characterising feature of persons is that they cannot form part of a whole and for this reason are incommunicable; cf. Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", §§ 11, 13, 18; "Utrum Christus fuerit homo in triduo passionis", § 4. Langton probably took over this criterion from Gilbert of Poitiers and his followers (cf. Nielsen 1982: 179 sqq.), and he seems to have experienced difficulties with fitting it into his conceptual framework; cf. above, note 65.

74 Applying a dual reading of 'aliquis' in order to salvage the sentence is apparently not an option for Langton, and this is presumably dictated by Langton's conviction that the masculine form necessitates a strictly personal reading; cf. above, note 51.

ment "Filius Dei loquitur" may be admitted inasmuch as it can be expanded so as to read "Filius Dei loquitur, quia iste homo quo Filius Dei loquitur". But this sentence cannot be true in a proper sense; it is true only in a figurative sense. In the same way self-referential statements, like the one quoted from the Gospel of John, Langton maintains, may be accepted as true only in a figurative sense. Langton explains that the figure of speech involved is a kind of personification or dramatical masking ("prosopopoeia") inasmuch as the Son of God talks about himself through the assumed human nature. In accordance with this, Langton is even willing to accept a statement such as "Filius Dei proprie loquitur", since "Iste homo, qui est Filius Dei, proprie loquitur". For the correct interpretation of this, it is, however, requisite that 'proprie' be linked to 'loquitur' and not to the subject term. Interpreted, this means that the incarnate Christ is fully capable of uttering proper human speech inasmuch as he assumed a genuinely or truly human body and soul. Nonetheless, Christ, who is a divine person, can only be the indirect subject for human activities such as speech inasmuch they follow from human nature with which he is united.[75]

In full accord with this line of reasoning Langton further maintains that in a sentence such as "Idem creavit virginem creandus ex virgine" there is a significant difference in the way in which the two verbs relate to the thing pointed to by the subject term. Whereas 'creavit' properly belongs to Christ as person, i.e. to the Son of God, 'creandus' belongs to the person only in an improper or figurative sense, which is to say by way of the assumed human nature.[76] For this reason, Langton states, in making Christ the subject of a sentence it is of major importance whether this is done by way of a noun which belongs to him as the Son of God or through a noun derived from the assumed human nature.[77]

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75 Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", § 21. This interpretation is strictly opposed to the view characteristic of the "Subsistence" theory according to which Christ is the immediate subject for both divine and human acts inasmuch as Christ assumed human nature as part of his being and for this reason is both soul and body as well as the ensuing human substance; cf. Nielsen 1982: 341 sqq.

76 Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", § 17.

77 Langton, "De homine assumpto ...", § 22. This passage might be taken to indicate that Langton would be willing to recognise that the assumed human nature ("homo iste") may function as supposite independently of the divine assuming person. This would, however, be a serious misunderstanding. What is at stake is whether all statements about Christ should be considered to be proper or not.

10. Conclusion

As far as the interpretation of the Incarnation is concerned, a common goal for the anonymous pupil of the Chanter and Langton was to maintain and defend that particular conception of the Incarnation which had been developed in the Lombard's school. To both theologians accommodating the papal condemnation of 1177 was no small challenge. On the one hand, they were disinclined to modify their basic conception of the ontological makeup of the incarnate Christ; and, strictly speaking, the condemnation did not explicitly require them to do so. On the other hand, they were forced to modify the interpretation of several Christological key-sentences, which had originated with the early proponents of this theory. In order to accomplish this task both attempted to demonstrate that their understanding of the controverted Christological key-sentences was firmly founded on current grammatical and logical doctrine.

With the anonymous Chanter pupil the changes made to the interpretation of a sentence such as "Christus secundum homo est aliquid" were clearly minor. Thus he simply substituted the original explanation, in which 'secundum' and 'aliquid' were endowed with different meanings, with a much simpler one which relied on the well-known distinction between personal and simple supposition. In accordance with this, the Chanter pupil argued for a strong distinction between a substantival and an adjectival interpretation of nouns, which was shown to be of paramount importance for interpreting statements about Christ. Furthermore, this author advocated a sharp distinction between what is personal and what is substantial and attempted to show that this distinction is valid for substantives as well. Moreover, he employed this distinction in order to obtain a very strict interpretation of demonstrative and relative pronouns.

The success of the Chanter pupil in bringing his interpretation of Christological key-sentences into agreement with current grammatical and logical doctrine was, however, not without its costs. Among the most damaging drawbacks to his exposition was undoubtedly that, on his premises, it would be indefensible to refer to Christ as man by way of a personal pronoun. Equally, all sentences had to be censured in which a relative clause was appended to a noun which accrued to Christ on the basis of his human nature.

Judging from Langton's discussion of this matter it appears that this limitation caused some embarrassment to theologians of the Lombard's persuasion. And Langton's most significant contribution to the further defence of this particular view of the Incarnation was his extending the distinction between a substantival and an adjectival reading of nouns so as to include pronouns and complex expressions containing a pronoun. On the other hand, as it clearly transpires from Langton's discussion of Christ as subject of sentences containing nouns or verbs which pertain to Christ's human nature, this amelioration did not signal any significant change to the basic view characteristic of the Lombard's school.

Seen from the perspective of theology it is undoubtedly true to say that neither the anonymous pupil of the Chanter nor Stephen Langton made major contributions to the understanding of the Incarnation. Their expositions clearly reveal that discussion on this point of theology had developed into a battle between firmly entrenched parties with neither side making much headway. To many theologians this situation was utterly frustrating, and somebody like Peter the Chanter ended up despising such discussions as no more than expressions of human curiosity.[78] Even to somebody like Praepositinus, who mastered the full weaponry of scholastic disputation, the finer logical points could at times seem quite futile.[79] Nonetheless, scholars such as the anonymous pupil of the Chanter and Stephen Langton exercised considerable influence on later generations, inasmuch as subsequent theologians continued to take their arguments into account and find adequate replies. To what degree this kind of "theological" logic influenced also the development of logic proper is a field of study still waiting to be cultivated.

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78 Cf. the gloss from the Chanter's commentary on the Pauline Epistles as quoted in Landgraf 1953: 133, note 79.

79 In the passage following immediately after the text quoted above, note 71, Praepositinus underscores that one does not have to enter into discussions revolving around the substantival and adjectival readings of pronouns and complex expressions containing a pronoun, since such a line of argument is clearly fallacious.

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